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IN SEARCH OF ALTERNATIVES OR ENHANCEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE 




Workplace forums as they are currently envisaged in the LRA1 are a dead duck. In 
the light of the decline in firm and plant-level bargaining a decision needs to be made 
about the appropriate vehicle through which engagement can take place at this level, 
particularly with a view to supplementing centralised bargaining. This endeavour will 
have to deal with the EEA2 and SDA,3 because the effect of the employment equity 
and skills development committees set up in terms of these statutes has been to 
divorce grading and training issues from the bargaining agenda. These issues are 
however critical if one wants to link skills to rewards.4  
From this quote and the discussion that follows it is evident that the provisions 
pertaining to workplace forums in their current format have proved to be unsuccessful.  
The idea underlying the introduction of workplace forums, specifically, was to deal 
with productivity issues through consultation and joint decision-making, which issues 
did not fall within the scope of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is primarily 
concerned with issues such as improvements to terms and conditions, higher wages 
and so forth. Collective bargaining and its associated freedoms and rights focus on 
the use of power, and are a counter to the managerial prerogative of the employer.5 
Employees, as part of the collective process, can embark on strike action in order to 
force an employer to give in to their demands. Collective bargaining, by its nature, is 
adversarial. To counter this characteristic of collective bargaining the legislator 
introduced workplace forums as a complement to the collective bargaining system: it 
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author's LLD thesis entitled "Employee Participation and Voice: A Legal Perspective". E-mail: 
monray.botha@nwu.ac.za. 
1 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
2 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
3 Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. 
4 Godfrey, Theron and Visser State of Collective Bargaining 99. 
5 See in this regard BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers (2) 1989 10 ILJ 701 (IC). 
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grants workers participatory decision-making power and a voice, and deals with 
production issues at a workplace level. The system of workplace forums6 draws upon 
the model of the German works council system, and was enacted to "introduce a form 
of participatory workplace governance" and to create a system of participatory 
decision-making in addition to, or alongside, (adversarial) collective bargaining.7  
This article explores the position regarding workplace forums in South Africa and 
whether it is time to reconsider them (in some amended form) as a viable option for 
employee participation in decision-making.  
2 Setting the scene: an overview regarding collective bargaining 
Collective bargaining has a long history,8 as is evidenced by the developments in 
various countries. For workers collective bargaining is primarily a means of maintaining 
"certain standards of distribution of work, of rewards and of stability of employment", 
whereas employers view it as a means of maintaining "industrial peace".9 In general, 
the parties to collective bargaining engage in the process because employees are not 
happy with a decision of management: collective bargaining, thus, is more re-active 
than pro-active. Traditional collective bargaining10 is a mechanism to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of employment and is not a vehicle to facilitate joint decision-
making.11 Collective bargaining deals with a wide variety of disputes which fall within 
the ambit of "matters of mutual interest". These matters are not defined, and the term 
is broad enough to include disputes of interest or disputes of right inter alia, such 
matters include issues relating to the terms and conditions of employment, such as 
employee remuneration, service benefits and compensation. Disputes concerning 
mutual interests arise out of issues such as demands for higher wages, improved 
conditions of employment or a change to an existing collective agreement.12  
                                        
6 See ss 78-94 of the LRA. Workplace forums are provided for in ch V of the LRA. 
7 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 318. 
8 Du Toit 2007 ILJ 1405. 
9 See Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 69; Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 1; and Du Toit 
2007 ILJ 1405. 
10 Also see Van Jaarsveld 2009 THRHR 228-229 in this regard. 
11 Esser 2007 THRHR 425. 
12 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 317.  
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The greatest net benefit from collective bargaining can be obtained when a system is 
in place that promotes good faith bargaining and the efficient enforcement of collective 
agreements.13 One of the purposes of the LRA is to promote collective bargaining14 
and to provide a framework within which employers, employers' organisations, trade 
unions and employees can bargain collectively to determine conditions of employment, 
formulate industrial policy and provide for other matters of mutual interest.15  
The constitutional framework supports the provisions of the LRA. Section 23(5) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that every trade union, 
employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. 
Central to the collective bargaining framework is the recognition of the right to strike, 
as well as the granting to representative trade unions of certain organisational rights. 
The process of collective bargaining and the provisions of a collective agreement 
remain subject to scrutiny. For example, if the provisions unfairly discriminate against 
a particular group will constitute an infringement of the constitutional right to 
equality.16 Commentators suggest that labour law in South Africa (and in Southern 
Africa) should take the region's particular socio-economic profile into account and 
develop an indigenous paradigm.17  
South African labour legislation is superimposed on a rigid adversarial system based 
upon a liberal market system.18 Due to developments in South African corporate law 
and in the corporate landscape, as well as the importance attached to the promotion 
of participation in companies, the continuation of a rigid adversarial system "is 
incongruent with the direction"19 which many authors and commentators suggest the 
"new corporate project" could/should take.20  
                                        
13 Dau-Schmidt, Harris and Lobel Labor and Employment Law 96. 
14 Ch III of the LRA regulates collective bargaining in ss 11-63 of the Act. 
15 Preamble and s 1 of the LRA. 
16 See Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-69. See aslo South Africa Airways (Pty) 
Ltd v V 2014 35 ILJ 2774 (LAC). 
 
18 See Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
19 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
20 See also O'Regan 1990 Acta Juridica 119 and Du Toit 1993 Stell LR 332 in this regard. 
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The "liberal market system" can be contrasted with the "coordinated market system" 
found in certain European countries such as Germany,21 in which the relationship 
between the governance of a corporation and labour regulation differ. The relationship 
between labour law and corporate law is more harmonious in a coordinated market 
system because of the fact that the model seeks to institutionalise the views of 
employees within the company.22 In so doing employees are accepted as core 
stakeholders who contribute to the sustainability of the business and a sense of 
institutional responsibility is promoted.23 In European countries such as Austria, 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, employee participation mainly takes place in 
the form of works councils. The German model is regarded as the "first and most 
highly developed" model of worker participation.24 A "dual channel" representation 
system exists: first, employees are active on supervisory boards and second, trade 
unions play an active role, in the context not only of works councils but also in 
collective bargaining. In Germany, for example, co-determination has made a 
significant impact upon the regulation of executive compensation packages: national 
legislation, which provides for corporate governance requires labour representation on 
the boards of directors.25 The practice makes it possible to develop and to adhere to 
policies (in theory) that are likely to expand or at least to protect jobs, even if 
shareholder value may be compromised. 
In contrast to this system, the predominant system of employee participation in South 
Africa is collective bargaining. Labour and capital are represented by trade unions and 
employers organisations, as is evident from section 23(5) of the Constitution, which 
recognises the right to engage in collective bargaining. Nevertheless, 
[n]otwithstanding the right [to] bargain collectively, the law generally limits collective 
bargaining and its impact upon the so-called "core areas" of the managerial 
prerogative, ie determining the direction, plans and policies of the business.26  
                                        
21 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
22 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
23 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
24 Biasi 2014 IJCLLI 461. 
25 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
26 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
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The managerial prerogative of the employer entitles it to make strategic and 
operational decisions. Collective bargaining does not empower trade unions and 
employees with greater power regarding decision-making with regard to the direction, 
plans and policies of the business. For this reason co-determination, or joint decision-
making, over key decisions relating to the running of the business is not covered by 
collective bargaining.27 The latter issues are left entirely to management28 or to 
consultation/ joint decision-making.  
3 Workplace Forums 
3.1 Purpose and rationale for workplace forums 
Section 1(d)(iii) of the LRA sets the promotion of employee participation in workplace 
decision-making as a primary object. The LRA introduced workplace forums as a 
means of employee participation,29 and is part of a series of progressive labour law 
reforms, of which the LRA forms a part.30  
Workplace forums are intended to create a "second channel" of industrial relations31 
or representation;32 to act, not as an alternative to collective bargaining, but rather as 
a supplement to it. The introduction of workplace forums by the LRA was regarded as 
"the most important innovation"33 in the Act. One of the aims of the provision of 
workplace forums was to grant employees a voice in the workplace with regard to 
"production issues".34 The need for proper consultation and joint decision making on 
"non-distributive issues" (the so-called production issues) affecting the functioning of 
the enterprise between employers and employees in-house has long been recognised 
by both employers and workers.35 The voice provided to employees by the LRA relates 
to decisions that "affect them in their daily work activities", and provides an alternative 
                                        
27 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
28 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 316. 
29 See Van der Walt 2008 SA J Bus Man 45-51 in this regard. 
30 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-253.  
31 Van Niekerk 1995 CLL 32. 
32 Mtayi 1997 JBL 98. 
33 Olivier 1996 ILJ 803. 
34 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-25 as well as Steadman 2004 ILJ 1171. 
35 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-253.  
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alongside the existing "conflict-ridden" labour relations model in South Africa.36  
As wage matters, which typically deal with terms and conditions of employment, "were 
seen as the essential subject matter of collective bargaining between employers and 
trade unions, preferably at sectoral level",37 workplace forums are designed to deal 
largely with "non-wage" issues such as changes in the organisation of work, 
restructuring, the introduction of new technologies and work methods, health and 
safety at work. If viewed holistically within the national context, including the LRA, 
"the workplace forum promoted the narrowest form of dialogue between labour and 
capital, firstly, at the level of the workplace".38 In turn, "this underpinned collective 
bargaining at the sectoral level and social dialogue at national or regional level, 
conducted primarily through the establishment of the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council (NEDLAC)".39  
Even before the enactment of the LRA there was strong support for the basic premise 
of the workplace forum proposal. Summers, for example, articulated that he did not 
believe that "a society can be democratic, an economy can prosper and workers 
improve their life if management and employees see each other as adversaries".40 
Inevitably they compete for the returns from the enterprise, but they have "a common 
interest in increasing those returns".41 Cooperation in the workplace is essential 
because it not only makes work safer and more satisfying, but also makes it more 
productive. Summers therefore submits that a collective bargaining system "must be 
construed to encourage that cooperation".42  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Bill, 199543 motivated the 
creation of workplace forums as designed to facilitate the shift from adversarial 
collective bargaining on all matters to joint problem-solving and participation relating 
to certain aspects in the workplace. The Exploratory Memorandum further states: 
                                        
36 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-253.  
37 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2006) 343; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 389. 
38 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 318. 
39 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 318. 
40 Summers 1995 ILJ 809. 
41 Summers 1995 ILJ 809. 
42 Summers 1995 ILJ 809. 
43 Ministerial Task Team 1995 ILJ 310. 
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In creating a structure for ongoing dialogue between management and workers, 
statutory recognition is given to the realisation that unless workers and managers 
work together more effectively they will fail adequately to improve productivity and 
living standards. Workplace forums are designed to perform functions that collective 
bargaining cannot easily achieve: the joint solution of problems and the resolution of 
conflicts over production.44 
Thus, two assumptions underlie the LRA's provisions on workplace forums: in order 
for South Africa to respond to the challenges brought about by globalisation, 
productivity levels should be improved, which can be achieved only if a more 
cooperative relationship exists between labour and management.45 The issues 
(indicated above) that will contribute to "increased productivity" are unsuited to 
collective bargaining.46 This does not mean that conflict between management and 
workers will be eliminated completely but it ensures that conflictual relations will be 
removed from the organisation of production.47 The Exploratory Memorandum claims 
that the purpose of workplace forums is "not to undermine collective bargaining but 
to supplement it", which will be achieved by "relieving collective bargaining of 
functions to which it is not well suited".48 Therefore the LRA envisages a "clear and 
strict institutional separation" between workplace forums and collective bargaining in 
order "to keep distributive bargaining and cooperative relations apart, so as to allow 
the latter an opportunity to develop".49 
In South Africa, historically, trade unions have been hostile to forms of workplace 
consultation because they believe it may result in "co-option by management and the 
blunting of class struggle".50 On the other hand, the LRA seeks to encourage "non-
adversarial consultation" on issues such as productivity and workplace grievances by 
establishing workplace forums.51 This objective is evident in that it promotes joint 
problem solving by introducing a statutory forum for both consultation and joint 
decision-making to "augment" collective bargaining at workplace level.52  
                                        
44 Ministerial Task Team 1995 ILJ 310. See also Godfrey, Hirschsohn and Maree 1998 LDD 86. 
45 Klerck 1999 Transformation 14. 
46 Klerck 1999 Transformation 14. 
47 Klerck 1999 Transformation 14. 
48 Ministerial Task Team 1995 ILJ 315. Also see Klerck 1999 Transformation 14. 
49 Ministerial Task Team 1995 ILJ 316. Also see Klerck 1999 Transformation 14. 
50 Hepple 2012 SALJ 265. 
51 Hepple 2012 SALJ 265. 
52 Also see Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2006) 31 in this regard. 
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It can be argued that a having a voice in decision making provides workers with a 
more active role and a greater input than otherwise. Employees can provide more 
information on a production issue if the employer consults with them and improvement 
in the information flow takes place. Workplace forums facilitate this information flow, 
because they ensure that employees are more committed to participation. Emphasis 
is on the role of employee cooperation and harmonious labour relations, which, 
ultimately, will improve quality and efficiency in the organisation.  
Olivier states that the idea of corporatism in the notion of employee participation seeks 
to provide an alternative or a supplement to the "conflict relationship which has 
become so much part and parcel" of South African employment relations.53 
Corporatism works, in principle, on a presupposition which is sometimes vehemently 
contested, namely that a clear distinction should be drawn between collective 
bargaining and workplace forum activity.54 Two consequences flow from this 
presupposition: (i) production issues for which participatory structures are ideally 
suited should be institutionally separated from distributive issues meant for collective 
bargaining;55 and (ii) the institutional separation implies structural separation, which 
means that "the adversarial and co-operative structures should ideally operate at 
different levels, in order to avoid unnecessary conflict and competition from arising".56 
In order for the system to work, collective bargaining must be restricted to central 
level structures, whereas participation at plant level deals with day-to-day workplace 
issues and is not subjected to "the antagonisms generated by bargaining".57 
3.2 Establishment of workplace forums 
Workplace forums grant significant new rights to employees and also to trade unions. 
The LRA provides statutory protection to the participation of employees in workplace 
forums. Sections 79 and 82 of the LRA provide that all employees in the workplace, 
and not just union members, elect workplace forums and the workplace forum is 
                                        
53 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-147. 
54 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-147. 
55 Also see Smith 2000 Ga J Int'l & Comp L 615. 
56 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-147. 
57 Summers 1995 ILJ 807; Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-147.  
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charged with representing the entire workforce.58 Workplace forums can be 
established in any workplace where the employer employs 100 or more employees, 
and a trade union on its own if it is a majority representative union(s) or two or more 
registered trade unions acting together represent the majority of employees employed 
by the employer at the workplace.59 The application for the establishment of a 
workplace forum can be made to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA).60 A representative trade union that is recognised in terms of a 
collective agreement by an employer for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect of all employees in a workplace may also apply to the CCMA for the 
establishment of a workplace forum.61 
Workplace forums62 can take four forms:63 
(i) a bargained workplace forum based on a collective agreement which was 
entered into between the representative trade union and the employer;64  
(ii) a workplace forum with a bargained constitution;65  
(iii) a workplace forum constitution by a commissioner of the CCMA;66 and  
(iv) a trade union-based workplace forum.67  
3.3 Workplace forums' functions and powers 
Section 79 in Chapter V of the LRA sets out the general functions of workplace forums 
as follows: 
                                        
58 See ss 79 and 82 of the LRA as well as Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2006) 31 in this 
regard. Also see Delport 1995 De Jure 416. 
59 Section 80(1) of the LRA.  
60 Section 80(2) of the LRA. 
61 Section 81(1) of the LRA. 
62 The employer is not a part of such a workplace forum in South Africa: "[u]nlike some of its 
counterparts the statutory system does not provide for the employer to be part of or 
represented on the forum: the forum is rather seen as a body representing employee interests 
with which the employer has to engage before certain measures can be implemented" (Slabbert 
et al Managing Employment Relations 5-145). 
63 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1172. 
64 Section 80(7) of the LRA. 
65 Section 80(9) of the LRA. 
66 Section 80(9) of the LRA. 
67 Section 80(10) of the LRA. 
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i) to seek to promote the interests of all employees in the workplace (whether or 
not they are union members);  
ii) to enhance efficiency in the workplace; 
iii) to be consulted by the employer with a view to reaching consensus on the 
matters listed in section 84; and  
iv) to participate in joint decision making about the matters referred to in section 
86.  
The LRA has foreseen three forms of participation rights by workplace forums which 
are exercisable against the employer, namely consultation, joint decision-making and 
information-sharing.68  
3.3.1 Consultation 
Currently, consultation is required on the matters listed in section 84, whereas joint 
decision-making is required for matters listed in section 86. Consultation requires the 
employer "to do more than notify the forum of any proposal and in good faith to 
consider any suggestions it may make".69 Du Toit points out that consultation and 
joint decision-making are not the same as collective bargaining, but there are distinct 
points of connection between them: both processes involve discussion between 
employers and employees "on a collective basis over employment related issues" and 
for the employer "accustomed to dealing with employees in an autocratic or 
paternalistic way, as well as for workers, crossing one threshold may assist in crossing 
the other".70  
Section 85(1) requires, before an employer implements a proposal on any of the topics 
in section 84(1), that the employer "must consult the workplace forum and attempt 
to reach consensus with it". Extensive inroads into management's prerogative are 
made because the employer must obtain more than the opinion of the employee 
representatives on the issues.71 It seems that "consultation" means "negotiation", 
                                        
68 Olivier "Inchoate Regulation" 453; Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-148 - 5-
149. 
69 Grogan Workplace Law 332. 
70 Du Toit 1995 ILJ 803. 
71 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-259. 
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because there must be an attempt by the employer to reach consensus.72 The 
employer must allow the workplace forum to make representations and advance 
alternative proposals and if the employer disagrees, it must state reasons for its 
disagreement.73  
The definition of consultation in section 85(1) of the LRA is a departure from 
international practice, where the employer, generally, after hearing the workplace 
forum's views will decide; rather, it is "akin to good faith bargaining".74 This could 
have the effect of prolonging the consultation process and force the employer into 
various procedures before acting.75 Section 85(4) of the LRA provides that if the 
employer and the workplace forum cannot reach consensus, the employer must invoke 
any agreed procedure to resolve any differences before implementing the proposal. 
The implication of this "agreed deadlock-breaking mechanism", in principle, is that it 
remains possible to embark upon industrial action, unless the agreed procedure 
provides otherwise.76  
This position appears not only to be an unusual feature of consultation provided by 
the LRA,77 but is also regarded as unfortunate,78 based on the fact that it is the "very 
essence of cooperative systems that parties should not be allowed to use their 
economic weapons when agreement cannot be reached, but rather to make use of 
appropriate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms".79 Immense strain is put on 
the cooperative relationship, which could ruin the cooperative endeavour from the 
outset, since adversarial elements are brought into the relationship if the use of 
economic power is allowed.80  
An employer must consult on the following matters:81 
                                        
72 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1174. 
73 Sections 85(2) and (3) of the LRA. 
74 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1173. 
75 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1173. 
76 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-259. 
77 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1173. 
78 Olivier 1996 ILJ 813. 
79 Olivier 1996 ILJ 813. 
80 Olivier 1996 ILJ 813. 
81 Section 84(1) of the LRA. 
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(i) restructuring of the workplace (including the introduction of new technology 
and work methods);  
(ii) changes in the organisation of work;  
(iii) export promotion;  
(iv) job grading;  
(v) education and training;  
(vi) product development plans;  
(vii) partial or total plant closures;  
(viii) mergers and transfers of ownership in so far as they have an impact on the 
employees;  
(ix) the dismissal of employees for reasons based on operational requirements; 
(x) exemptions from any collective agreement or any law; and 
(xi) criteria for merit increases or the payment of discretionary bonuses.  
The above list can be extended. A bargaining council may confer on a workplace forum 
the right to be consulted about additional matters that fall within the registered scope 
of the bargaining council.82 A representative trade union and an employer may also 
conclude a collective agreement conferring on a workplace forum the right to be 
consulted about any additional matters83 and any law may confer on a workplace 
forum the right to be consulted about additional matters.84 An agreement can be 
reached that the workplace forum can also exercise health and safety functions.85 The 
issues for consultation, therefore, may be said to broadly cover many matters of 
mutual interest. 
It has been said that "consultation", in effect, "represents an extension of collective 
bargaining to the level of the workplace".86 Grogan points out that the LRA prescribes 
that an employer shall consult a forum "with a view to reaching consensus", which 
"seems to come very close to what is normally understood to be collective 
                                        
82 Section 84(2) of the LRA. 
83 Section 84(3) of the LRA. 
84 Section 84(4) of the LRA. 
85 Section 84(5) of the LRA. 
86 Anstey Employee Participation 164. 
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bargaining".87 He adds that "[a]ny premature implementation of a proposal under 
consultation may be reversed by the appointed arbitrator of the CCMA". 88 As indicated 
above, this ruling holds certain risks for a successful cooperative model. 
3.3.2 Joint decision-making 
The employer must enter into joint decision-making once the workplace forum is 
established.89 Joint decision-making places serious limitations on the managerial 
prerogative of the employer: the employer is compelled to obtain concurrence with 
the workplace forum on certain matters that are subject to joint decision-making.90 
Joint decision-making requires the employer to consult with the workplace forum and 
reach consensus.91 Joint decision-making fundamentally breaks with "unilateralism 
and hierarchical decision-making" in the workplace, because workers can prevent 
management from deciding on a particular issue unless the consent of the workplace 
forum has been obtained.92 In these instances, a proposal may not be implemented 
without the forum's consent.93  
The following matters require joint decision-making: 
(i) disciplinary codes and procedures,  
(ii) measures designed to protect and advance persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination,  
(iii) rules for the proper regulation of the workplace other than work-related 
conduct and  
(iv) changes to the rules of employer-controlled social benefit schemes by the 
employer or employer-representatives on the trusts or boards governing such 
schemes.94  
                                        
87 Grogan Workplace Law 333. 
88 Grogan Workplace Law 333. 
89 Section 86(1) of the LRA. 
90 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-149. Also see Satgar 1997 LDD 45. 
91 Section 86(1) of the LRA. 
92 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-149. Also see Satgar 1997 LDD 45. 
93 Section 86(1) of the LRA. 
94 Section 86(1) of the LRA. 
MM BOTHA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1825 
A collective agreement can be concluded between a representative trade union and 
an employer conferring on the workplace forum the right to joint decision-making on 
additional matters or removing any matter in section 86(1) from the list of matters 
requiring joint decision-making.95 Any other law may also confer the right to 
participate in joint decision-making matters on the workplace forum.96  
If the employer and the workplace forum cannot reach consensus, the employer must 
refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with an agreed procedure or, if there is 
no agreed procedure, refer the dispute to the CCMA.97 The employer must satisfy the 
CCMA that a copy of the referral has been served on the chairperson of the workplace 
forum. The CCMA must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation and, if it 
remains unresolved, the employer may request that the dispute be resolved through 
arbitration.98  
In the case of section 86-matters the employer may not unilaterally implement a 
proposal. The right to strike over such issues does not exist99 and the parties are 
subject to alternative dispute resolution processes to settle a dispute concerning 
matters regarding joint decision making.100 However, the LRA does not exclude the 
possibility that employees may embark on strike action if no agreement can be 
reached on a matter that is the subject of consultation.  
3.3.3 Information-sharing 
Coupled with the rights to consultation and joint decision making is the right to the 
disclosure of information.101 The information must be relevant, that is, information 
which allows the workplace forum to engage in consultation and/or joint decision 
making. No reciprocal obligation exists to disclose information: only employers are 
obliged to disclose information, and no obligation rests upon the workplace forum.102 
                                        
95 Section 86(2) of the LRA. 
96 Section 86(3) of the LRA. In this regard see the discussion on the EEA below. 
97 Section 86(4) of the LRA. 
98 Sections 86(5)-(8) of the LRA. 
99 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1174. 
100 Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-266.  
101 Section 89(1) of the LRA.  
102 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1173. 
MM BOTHA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1826 
If information is confidential, the employer must notify the workplace forum in writing 
that the information disclosed is confidential.103 A dispute must be referred to the 
CCMA for conciliation if a dispute exists with regard to the disclosure of information, 
and should the dispute be unresolved any party may request for it to be referred to 
arbitration.104  
The commissioner has the power to decide if the information is relevant. If the 
commissioner so decides and if it is information regarding an employee's private 
personal information or the employer's confidential information, then the 
commissioner must "balance the harm that the disclosure is likely to cause to an 
employee or employer against the harm that the failure to disclose the information is 
likely to cause to the ability of the workplace forum to engage effectively in 
consultation and joint decision-making".105 If the commissioner decides that the 
balance of harm favours the disclosure of the information, the commissioner may 
order the disclosure of information on terms designed to limit the harm likely to be 
caused to the employee or the employer.106  
When the commissioner makes an order in terms of section 89(9) of the LRA, the 
commissioner must take into account any breach of confidentially in respect of the 
information being disclosed and the commissioner has the power to refuse to order 
the disclosure of requested information and any other confidential information that 
might otherwise be disclosed for a period specified in the arbitration award.107 Section 
91 of the LRA further provides that if the commissioner finds in a dispute (about an 
allegation of the breach of confidentiality) that such a breach has occurred, the 
commissioner may order the withdrawal of the right to the disclosure of information 
in that workplace for a period specified in the arbitration award. The regulation 
therefore penalises the misuse of confidential information ex post facto. 
                                        
103 Section 89(2A) of the LRA. 
104 Sections 89(3)-(6) of the LRA. 
105 Sections 89(7)-(8) of the LRA. 
106 Section 89(9) of the LRA. 
107 Section 89(10) of the LRA. 
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3.4 Problems and concerns regarding workplace forums 
3.4.1 General 
Workplace forums as a model for employee participation remain unpopular108 and 
largely unsuccessful. Olivier, for example, notes that unlike the position in some 
European countries such as the Netherlands and Germany, the LRA "lacks a provision 
to the effect that workplace forums may initiate consultation or joint decision making 
in respect of a particular matter".109 In South Africa the employer remains the initiator, 
depriving the workplace forum of the ability to be proactive. 
Collective bargaining is the primary means of negotiating with employers, in that it 
still is largely concerned with settling the terms and conditions of employment and the 
resolution of disputes between employers and employees. The idea of the drafters of 
the 1995-LRA (novel as it seems to be) was to depart from the tradition of collective 
bargaining between trade unions and employers and, instead, to provide for "more 
co-operative interaction between management and labour alongside collective 
bargaining" in order to allow non-wage issues "that previously fell within the scope of 
managerial prerogative" to be dealt with through consultation and joint-decision-
making.110 Regrettably, after almost 20 years the LRA prima facie has not succeeded 
in giving effect to this object and goal. Du Toit adds that the challenge has largely 
been obscured by the controversy surrounding the provisions for the establishment of 
workplace forums in chapter V of the LRA, and that workplace forums, originally, were 
presented as serving an unfortunate purpose: 
… that of facilitating "major restructuring of the economy" by promoting a shift from 
"adversarial collective bargaining on all matters to joint problem-solving and 
participation on certain [production-related] subjects". This would be done by 
creating a "second channel" of industrial relations, partly modelled on the works 
councils of Germany and the Netherlands. The message thus sent to unions was 
ominous: restructuring and job losses that unions would fight tooth and nail in the 
bargaining arena were expected to find greater acceptance if negotiated with "non-
adversarial" workplace forums. Not even the fact that the LRA ultimately gave unions 
all but absolute control over workplace forums could disarm unions' suspicions or 
                                        
108 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2006) 45; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 53. 
109 Olivier 1996 ILJ 805. 
110 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2006) 341; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 387. 
MM BOTHA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)5 
 
1828 
dispel the belief that workplace forums, however constituted, would inevitably serve 
as cats' paws for employers and sow divisions among workers.111  
The quotation makes clear that the move away from adversarialism was unsuccessful, 
as trade unions did not relinquish their control over production-related issues, such as 
restructuring. Trade unions, de facto, have prevented workplace forums from being 
set up, by exercising their veto power or by not initiating the process for the 
establishment of a workplace forum. If the provisions of the LRA are compared with 
those of the EEA, it is clear from the EEA that the obligation to consult on employment 
equity "does not affect the obligation to consult and reach 'consensus' with a 
workplace forum, where one exists":112 unlike the LRA, the EEA does not define the 
content of the duty to consult. It can therefore be deduced that the meaning of 
"consultation" 113 under the LRA is: 
 (i) putting a proposal rather than completed decisions to employee 
representatives;  
(ii) disclosing all relevant information;  
(iii) allowing representatives to respond to these proposals; and  
(iv) responding to alternative proposals and, if not acceptable to the employer, 
explaining its reasons for the rejection thereof.114  
The EEA's Code of Good Practice recommends a more informal approach, which 
includes the opportunity to meet and report back, a reasonable opportunity to meet 
employers, and to request, receive and consider information. The Code suggests that 
a workplace forum or consultative forum representing both designated and non-
designated employees should either be utilised or established.115 However, there is no 
reliable data which shows the extent to which employment equity issues are discussed 
by the (few) workplace forums that exist.116  
                                        
111 Du Toit 2007 ILJ 1426. 
112 Hepple 2012 SALJ 265-266. 
113 Also see s 85(1) of the LRA. 
114 Hepple 2012 SALJ 266. 
115 Hepple 2012 SALJ 266. 
116 Hepple 2012 SALJ 266. 
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These concerns with regard to workplace forums, however, are not unique to South 
Africa. In Italy and France, trade unions have a priority right to monitor candidates for 
election to works councils and thus retain control over the process of selection and 
ensure a direct link with the trade union. In Sweden, trade unions retain the sole 
power within structures in the workplace.117  
3.4.2 Trade union opposition and mistrust 
In South Africa the reason for the non-establishment of workplace forums is the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions' (COSATU's) continuing opposition.118 
COSATU is of the view that workplace forums undermine or clash with shop steward 
committees and, therefore, weaken the trade union organisation.119 Trade unions 
mistrust the workplace forum system in the sense that they feel that it might have an 
impact on their power in the workplace:120 thus they fear that consultation will leave 
power in the hands of the employer.121 If trade unions with an existing and strong 
base in the workplace leave matters to the workplace forum (so the argument goes) 
the employer will be in the driving seat because for matters listed in section 84 it is 
required that an employer must simply attempt to reach consensus and no agreement, 
therefore, is necessary. From this it is clear that the matters for consultation by 
workplace forums are not the same as those reserved for collective bargaining. 
The reluctance of trade unions to establish workplace forums may be because of past 
experience, their role in collective bargaining and the diffusion of powers.122 Trade 
                                        
117 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations 255. 
118 See COSATU'S view expressed already in 1997 regarding the establishment of workplace 
forums: "The new LRA makes provision for workplace forums, triggered by majority unions, as 
vehicles for workplace democracy. While it is significant that this legislation institutionalises 
workers' rights to workplace democracy, workplace forums as outlined in the legislation hold 
many dangers for unions (and employers). We strongly support the argument that workplace 
forums should be union-based rather than independently elected. In other words, the powers 
of information, consultation and joint decision-making should be conferred directly on the 
shopstewards [sic] committee; alternatively, the shopsteward committee should nominate 
members to the workplace forum. Otherwise there is a danger that the workplace forum will 
either become a substitute for the shopsteward committee, or will be a very weak consultative 
forum. A workplace forum independent from union structures will be a recipe for division" 
(COSATU 1997 http://www.cosatu.org.za). 
119 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2006) 45; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 54.  
120 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1189. 
121 Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations 255. 
122 Du Toit 2000 ILJ 1564. 
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unions are also of the opinion that in the absence of a duty to bargain workplace 
forums may erode the existing collective bargaining structures.123 The matters listed 
in section 86 are limited to operational issues and not to strategic issues. 
Consequently, though the workplace forum and the employer have joint decision-
making power, potentially the forum is limited to the matters expressly listed in section 
86.  
3.4.3 Failure to reconcile 
Olivier contends that the LRA failed to reconcile the tension between "workplace 
unionism/collective bargaining and the workplace activity", and also failed to meet the 
"need to democratise the workplace and the need to increase efficiency and 
productivity".124 Brassey suggests that a workplace forum is "a misshapen beast that 
no one seems keen to ride".125 It has become apparent that the introduction of the 
system of workplace forums was met with distrust on the part of both labour and 
capital: as labour thought the process of collective bargaining would be compromised 
and capital was concerned that the managerial prerogative would be undermined in 
the workplace forum.126 The system ultimately put forward was one in which the 
powers of workplace forums were diluted: safeguards were built in to ensure that they 
operated in favour of the trade union movement.127 The perceived trade-off appears 
to be quite unsuccessful as the position regarding workplace forums and their 
legitimacy is regarded as neither fowl nor fish. 
 
3.4.4 Biggest flaw 
The biggest flaw, as suggested by commentators, is that trade unions normally 
negotiate with employers on matters listed in sections 84 and 86, but now the 
negotiation could take place to the workplace forum, in which the employer must 
attempt to reach consensus or is subject to joint decision making (rather than 
                                        
123 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1191.  
124 Olivier 1996 ILJ 807. 
125 Brassey et al Commentary on the Labour Relations Act A5-1. 
126 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 319. 
127 Davis and Le Roux 2012 Acta Juridica 319. 
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bargaining and reaching agreement). Hepple points out that the number of matters 
listed for joint decision making in a South African workplace forum is extremely limited 
in comparison with the extensive powers a German works council has regarding co-
determination.128 The list of co-decision matters can be extended by means of 
collective agreements, but no evidence exists that employers would be willing to agree 
to these extensions.129 
3.4.5 Size of workplace and majoritarianism 
Other peculiar aspects of the system include that there must be more than 100 
employees in the workplace and that any representative trade union may apply to the 
CCMA for the establishment of a workplace forum.130  
First, this excludes many workplaces due to the size requirement. Second, the 
dominant role of trade unions severely threatens the aim of the LRA, that of promoting 
employee participation.131 Olivier is of the view that the fact that only majority trade 
unions (or trade unions who together represent the majority of employees) may apply 
for the establishment of a workplace forum is "an extraordinary requirement given the 
realities of the South African scenario", and that the relatively modest level of union 
membership makes it "wholly inappropriate to require that majority unions should 
serve as the compulsory trigger for the establishment of a forum".132  
The dependency on majority trade unions to initiate a workplace forum disempowers 
non-unionised employees, because most members of the workplace forum will come 
from the trade union, which serves the interests of its members and threatens the 
promotion of the needs of the employees as a whole.133 Brassey adds that the 
provision in the LRA for workplace forums, which was included in the hope that 
negotiations might take place "to enlarge the corporate cake before dividing it up (so-
called integrative bargaining)", was unfortunate, and it is also subject to a majoritarian 
                                        
128 Hepple "Comparing Employee Involvement" 90. 
129 Hepple "Comparing Employee Involvement" 90. 
130 Section 80 of the LRA. 
131 Van der Walt 2008 SA J Bus Man 47. 
132 Olivier 1996 ILJ 810. 
133 Olivier 1996 ILJ 811. 
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override "that has served to make a complete dead letter of the elaborate set of 
provisions".134  
3.4.6 Failed proposed amendments  
Although the reasoning behind workplace forums was to move away from adversarial 
behaviour135 and promote employee participation, only a limited number of workplace 
forums have been established. An attempt to develop a more flexible approach was 
proposed in the 2000 version of the Labour Relations Amendment Bill136 (which 
proposed amendments to sections 78 and 80 of the LRA),137 making the formation 
and functioning of workplace forums less dependent on majority unions and ensuring 
that many more workplaces potentially could benefit from the establishment of 
workplace forums. One proposal was that a workplace forum could be established in 
a workplace of fewer than 100 employees.138 Another was that a registered trade 
union could apply to establish a workplace forum where the majority of employees in 
the workplace were not trade union members. This establishment could be successful 
only if non-union members and a majority of the employees as a whole supported the 
application.139 A third proposal was that where no registered trade union was present 
in the workplace, the majority of employees could apply to establish a workplace 
forum.140  
These proposals were intended to enhance the opportunity for unionised as well as 
non-unionised employees to establish workplace forums. Unfortunately, they were not 
adopted. The speculation is that the unions felt it would undermine the efforts of 
unions to organise if a workplace forum could be established by a majority of 
employees where there was no registered trade union in the workplace141 or where a 
registered trade union could apply for the establishment of a workplace forum where 
                                        
134 Brassey 2013 ILJ 833. 
135 Van der Walt 2008 SA J Bus Man 46. 
136 Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2000. 
137 Olivier "Inchoate Regulation" 455.  
138 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1175. 
139 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1175. 
140 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1175. 
141 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1175. 
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the majority of employees are non-union members and with the support of a majority 
of employees.142  
Another possible reason for the non-acceptance of the proposals is that employers 
were concerned about the over-regulation of small business - especially the fact that 
a workplace forum, in terms of these proposals, could be established in workplaces 
with fewer than 100 employees.143  
It appears that the amendments also failed to address the following issues:144 
(i) the preference afforded to majority unions;  
(ii) the enforceability and status of workplace agreements;  
(iii) the overlapping functions that existed between trade unions and workplace 
forums (including the matters identified for consultation and joint decision 
making in terms of section 84 and 86 of the LRA); and  
(iv) "the lack of a right to initiate" consultation and decision-making.  
3.4.7 Management concerns 
However, trade unions were not alone in being concerned about the proposals, as 
concerns were also voiced by the management representatives, who were of the view 
"that the drafters had adopted a method of enforcement rather than enablement, and 
that the principles of voluntarism had been ignored".145 Further, the model was 
perceived as introducing "far-reaching new rights for employees going to the heart of 
business effectiveness and efficiency while there was no corresponding protection for 
employers against the abuse and misuse of these rights by employees".146 The 
management representatives also argued that although the LRA provided some 
protection against the disclosure of confidential information, the protection was 
inadequate, and "no recourse was provided for in the case of 'other abuses'".147 
Employers were also concerned about disputes automatically becoming disputes of 
                                        
142 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1176. 
143 Steadman 2004 ILJ 1176.  
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right, the possibility that employees would be incapable of understanding the issues 
raised in the workplace forums, and the ability and readiness of trade unions to 
participate effectively through the use of shop steward representatives.148  
The fear of the unknown is noted by Du Toit et al149 as one of the negative reactions 
to workplace forums: both labour and management were (and still are) uncertain as 
to how workplace forums would perform with regard to certain issues.150 According to 
Steadman, these issues include the democratisation of firms, empowerment, the 
improvement of industrial relations, the enhancement of economic performance, the 
definition of a workplace, the representation of non-unionised employees, the 
disclosure of information, the relationship with collective bargaining structures, how 
deadlocks will be resolved, and so forth.151  
4 Concluding remarks  
It is evident from the discussion that the position regarding collective bargaining and 
workplace forums is still problematic. It is suggested that for a dual system to work, 
the following far-reaching changes should be implemented, after buy-in is obtained 
from the social partners: 
 Workplace forums should be recognised as legitimate forums in which to 
address the non-distributive issues identified in sections 84 and 86 of the LRA, 
as well as those identified by learning from comparative experiences.  
 The status and legal nature of workplace forums should be spelled out clearly 
and the agreements entered into between the workplace forum and the 
employer should have the same legal effect as a collective agreement otherwise 
entered into between a trade union and the employer. A legally binding effect 
and application similar to a works agreement in Germany should be attached 
to agreements entered into between an employer and a workplace forum. 
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 The power of trade unions over the establishment of workplace forums should 
be relinquished 20 years after the inception of the LRA.152 Earlier it was noted 
that even the fact that trade unions were given ultimate control over workplace 
forums could not disarm union suspicions. From the recent amendments in the 
2014 Amendment Act, it is evident the legislator is attempting to move away 
from unbridled majoritarianism, for example by giving an arbitrator the power 
to grant minority unions (who meet certain conditions) access to the 
organisational rights that are presently available only to majority trade 
unions.153 The same principle should be applied to the establishment of 
workplace forums: the requirement for majority trade unions to be party to the 
establishment of a workplace forum thus falls away. In addition, it is proposed 
that if the dual system of collective bargaining and workplace forums continues 
there should be an amendment regarding the representivity of trade unions on 
workplace forums. A compromise model could grant trade unions a number of 
seats on the workplace forum: employee representatives would have 50% 
representation on such a forum and trade union representatives the remaining 
50%; the casting vote in the case of a deadlock would be exercised by an 
independent, elected chairperson.154 These measures would ensure, when the 
workplace forum consults or engages with an employer on issues of joint 
decision-making and a vote is taken, that the process would function smoothly. 
At least, there should be significant agreement from the side of the trade 
unions. Another consequence would result in production issues being limited to 
the domain of workplace forums and non-productive issues to collective 
bargaining. The model is based on the German model of "quasi-parity co-
determination", which can be found in certain industries and refers to the 
arrangement whereby "shareholders and employees can appoint an equal 
number of representatives on the supervisory board, but the right to appoint 
the chair belongs to the shareholders – thus tilting the power balance slightly 
                                        
152 Given the political climate in South Africa this might be extremely difficult to achieve, especially 
if in 2015 South Africa has a coalition government and a tripartite system for regulating labour 
law generally.  
153 See ss 21(8A) and 21(8C) of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014. 
154 Such a chairperson could, for example, be a CCMA commissioner or a mediator or arbitrator. 
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in favour of shareholder representatives".155 It is suggested that the 
model156could be adapted towards such a compromise model to establish 
representation on the workplace forum without tilting the balance in favour of 
either employee representatives or trade union representatives by appointing 
an independent chairperson. Such a model would attach greater legitimacy to 
the process, and might reassure trade unions that they are not redundant or 
that their role in the workplace is not being usurped by the workplace forum. 
Also, the dependency for the establishment of a workplace forum on the 
agreement of a majority representative trade union should be scrapped. 
 It is a concern that industrial action is possible after the consultation process 
(in terms of section 84 of the LRA) has failed. Thus, retaining the right to strike 
reflects a serious doubt as to whether the distinction between distributive issues 
(reserved for bargaining and strikes) and non-distributive ones (for workplace 
forums) realistically can be maintained. The right to strike exists in respect of 
matters for consultation once there is an issue in dispute in terms of section 64 
of the LRA. Strike action is possible in respect of the employer's proposal itself 
and not in respect of alleged procedural defects in the consultation process 
(which must be referred to arbitration in terms of section 94 of the LRA).157 
The inclusion of the right to strike in the latter instance has been criticised as 
straining the co-operative relationship. Not only could it ruin the whole 
endeavour but it also introduce adversarial elements into the relationship 
between workplace forums and employers.158 
                                        
155 Du Plessis, Hargovan and Bagaric Principles 349-350. Also see Wooldridge 2005 Amicus Curiae 
21 and Addison and Schnabel 2011 Industrial Relations 356-357 regarding parity and quasi-
parity.  
156 Although this model is based on supervisory co-determination, the manner in which it operates 
should be noted and could be useful in the context of how a deadlock between trade union 
representatives and employees (as suggested) could be resolved if we amend the provision 
regarding workplace forums and move to a position where a compromise could be reached in 
doing away with the majority representative requirement but still utilising workplace forums (in 
an amended format). 
157 See in this regard Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 416. 
158 See in this regard Slabbert et al Managing Employment Relations 5-266. 
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 In addition it is suggested that workplace forums be allowed to initiate the 
consultative process by submitting proposals to the employer (unlike under the 
current dispensation by which the employer alone has this power).159 This is a 
departure as it allows the workplace forum to raise issues in respect of matters 
listed in section 84 of the LRA and, thus, would be in line with the German 
position whereby works councils and employers enjoy equal status in raising 
matters for consultation and joint-decision-making.160 It is proposed that 
section 85 of the LRA should be amended to call for consultation "in good time", 
161 as is the position in Germany. Currently the provision does not specify when 
the employer must consult with the workplace forum. For the change to 
meaningfully affect the way in which employers consult with workers, it should 
shift from merely notifying the forum of any proposal to considering legitimately 
and in good faith suggestions the workplace forum makes. The demand is for 
a committed process in which "voice" of the workplace forum is taken into 
consideration and its proposals are taken seriously: a change which calls for 
better regulation. 
 On the other hand, it is suggested that if matters in terms of section 84 of the 
LRA are maintained then the either option of strike action would be limited or 
the dispute would be subjected to mediation and possibly arbitration after 
mediation. 
(i) Immediate strike action would fall away as these issues would not be 
"strikeable" in terms of the limitation of section 65(1)(c) of the LRA, as the dispute 
would be considered a "rights dispute". This would thus force the parties162 to continue 
with mediation (possibly followed by advisory arbitration) when consultation was 
unsuccessful or there was a dispute that prevented consensus. The situation would be 
dealt with in a similar manner as when a refusal to bargain takes place. A dispute 
concerning an alleged refusal to bargain163 is subject to advisory arbitration, but 
                                        
159 See s 84(1) of the LRA as well as Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 403 in this regard. 
160 See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 403. 
161 See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law (2015) 403 in this regard. 
162 If a workplace forum is in place, the LRA should be amended regarding the resolution of 
disputes by limiting the right to strike regarding issues that are the subject of consultation and 
joint decision-making.  
163 See s 64(2) of the LRA in this regard.  
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advisory arbitration is not final and binding and so parties who are subject to it are not 
denied their rights to strike (which may simply be delayed). 
(ii) It is proposed that in cases where consultation in terms of section 84 of the 
LRA is unsuccessful the dispute should be referred to compulsory mediation, where an 
independent mediator would facilitate the process. It would then be up to the parties 
to reach an agreement. Further, it is proposed that when mediation is unsuccessful 
the parties should refer the dispute to advisory arbitration. The position would be 
similar to the situation of the arbitration committee in the German system. It should 
be noted that it is not ideal that there should be a strike after unsuccessful section 84 
consultations, but in the context of the need to uphold fundamental rights and the 
existing hostility of trade unions, it is proposed that strikes should be allowed only 
after mediation and advisory arbitration have proven to be unsuccessful. An advisory 
award should be obtained from the CCMA (as in refusal to bargain cases) before notice 
of a proposed strike or lock-out is given.  
(iii) In the case of section 86 matters, the employer may not unilaterally implement 
a proposal, and the right to strike over such issues also does not exist. The parties are 
subject to an alternative dispute resolution process to settle disputes concerning 
matters with reference to joint decision making. It is proposed that in order to address 
the inclusion of the right to strike in consultation matters the limitation should be 
applied to consultation matters (with regard to the use of strike action). Currently the 
level of dispute resolution is different when it comes to matters relating to consultation 
and joint decision making.  
(iv) In summary, strikes should be limited in cases of consultation. After 
consultation was unsuccessful a dispute should also be referred to mediation and if 
the parties cannot reach an agreement the dispute be referred to advisory arbitration. 
Only after advisory arbitration would the parties be able to give notice of industrial 
action.  
In closing, it is suggested that further research is required to assess whether 
workplace forums (in whatever shape or form) would provide the means by which the 
labour relations environment could transcend its existing state. In other words, the 
extent of the conflictual relationship in workplaces where workplace forums are 
adopted should be monitored over time. The legislature should as a matter of urgency 
re-evaluate the role and place of workplace forums in the South African labour law 
framework. 
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